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separate property of the husband. While recognizing that the
veteran had no vested right to the payments, the court held that
such payments rested upon a moral obligation of the government
to compensate the disabled veteran or his dependents for his loss
of earning power. Consequently, the payments could not be con-
sidered as purely gratuitous, and therefore constituted assets of
the community.
In Succession of Rusciana32 the heirs of the decedent spouse
sought to recover one-half of the value of certain improvements
made upon her second husband's separate property with funds
belonging to the community." The evidence showed that $10,000
of community funds had been spent in improving the property.
The court held that the actual cost of the improvements could
not be used to determine the increased value of the property.
The recovery is limited to one-half of the increase in value re-
sulting from the improvements, to be measured by value of the
property at the beginning of the community and at its dissolu-
tion.84
During the past term, the court also decided the following
cases dealing with successions, donations, and community prop-
erty. They are Gilbert v. Heintz,85 Succession of Pailet,86 Suc-
cession of Baragona,7 Succession of Franz, 8 and Balzrette v.
Hughes.3 9 These cases have been omitted from this discussion
because the decisions turned solely on questions of fact.
CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS
J. Denson Smith*
In Plummer v. Motors Insurance Corp.,' the court found the
way to substantial justice through a confused and confusing
situation. Plaintiff was the credit purchaser of a truck that had
sustained fire damage. The insurer took the truck into its pos-
session for the required repairs. Before they were made the
32. 96 So.2d 1 (La. 1957).
83. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 2408 (1870).
34. The case was remanded in order that evidence might be introduced to
establish the value of the property at the beginning of the community.
35. 231 La. 535, 91 So.2d 784 (1956).
36. 231 La. 972, 93 So.2d 235 (1957).
37. 231 La. 1016, 93 So.2d 542 (1957).
38. 232 La. 310, 94 So.2d 270 (1957).
39. 232 La. 509, 94 So.2d 649 (1957).
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University..
1. 96 So.2d 605 (La. 1957).
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finance company holding plaintiff's notes and mortgage wrong-
fully took possession of the truck and it was ultimately disposed
of by the original seller. Although the real nature of plaintiff's
action was in doubt, even by plaintiff's own admission in argu-
ment, the court concluded that the suit, for the value of the
truck, was not on the insurance contract but rested on the ground
that the insurer had wrongfully failed to return the truck to
plaintiff. Hence the articles of the Code dealing with deposit
were found applicable. Plaintiff was given judgment for the
value of the truck after the fire but before the repairs, its value
at the time the depositary took possession of it. The insurer
was, in turn, given like judgment against the finance company
which it had called as a third party defendant. There were too
dissents with respect to the amount of the judgment on the
ground that the plaintiff should have been awarded the value
the truck would have had after the repairs. There is much to be
said in favor of the view that the latter amount would have re-
flected more accurately the loss plaintiff suffered in not having
the truck returned to him in a state of repair. Perhaps a liberal
construction of plaintiff's pleadings could have supported such
an award. However, it is not clear that it would have been ap-
propriate against the insurer merely as a depositary. In any
event, the plaintiff fared very well. The finance company's
wrongful conduct not only obliged it to reimburse him the value
of the truck but presumably extinguished his debt.
In recent years the court has held firmly to the position that
in contracts to convey real estate the time fixed for the execu-
tion of the act of sale is of the essence and if it is allowed to pass
without a demand for performance it is then too late for either
party to put the other in default. The writer has expressed a
doubt concerning the validity of this position under the Code.2
The case of Caplan v. Airport Properties, Inc.,8 seems to have
involved some recession from this view; or this may be just wish-
ful thinking. There the time fixed for the transfer of the prop-
erty was extended three times at the request of the vendor,
after which it appears to have passed without a formal putting
in default. Some three months later the vendee did make formal
demand for performance and the court seemingly found it suf-
ficient. In the light of the earlier decisions, it is not clear
2. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term -
Rate, 16 LOUISimvA LAW RzViEW 242 (1956), and comments there cited.
3. 231 La. 1071, 93 So.2d 661 (1957).
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why the court did not consider the delay important. Be that
as it may, the purchaser was given judgment for double the
amount of the deposit despite an apparent inability of the vendor
to convey a valid title. Ducuy v. Falgoust4 was cited as authority
for this holding. Presumably the deposit was earnest money, so
that the instant case may stand for the proposition that a for-
feiture of earnest money may be enforced against a vendor who
is unable to convey valid title, a point left in doubt in Ducuy v.
Falgoust.5 Of course, the contract form here used may have been
similar to that in the mentioned case. The report is silent on the
point.
In Everhardt v. Sighinolfi,6 a contract to sell real estate was
specifically enforced in favor of the purchaser. The vendor's
contention that he had not been placed in default was answered
by observing that he had absented himself from the country until
after the time stated for the passing of the act of sale had
elapsed. In result, a putting in default would have been a vain
and useless thing. The court pointed out that under the form of
contract employed in this case the purchaser is not automatically
in default by failing to comply at the time stated but may be put
in default only by a tender of title. Certainly this was a case
where the seller's defense was wholly without merit, and the
court, having the authority to allow further time for perform-
ance even to a party in default,7 should have enforced the con-
tract, as it did, in favor of the vendee.
In Agurs v. Holt,8 an action to reform an act of sale on the
basis of mutual error was properly treated as a personal action
to which the prescription of ten years applies. In keeping with
the principle recognized in Article 2221 of the Civil Code and
confirmed by earlier cases, the prescriptive period was held to
begin upon discovery of the error or the date it should have been
discovered by the use of due diligence.
In a well-reasoned opinion in Town & Country Contractors v.
Henderson,9 it was held that a contractor who does not substan-
tially perform his contractual undertaking is not entitled to re-
4. 228 La. 533, 83 So.2d 118 (1955).
5. See Smith, Recovery o1 Damages for Non-Delivery and Eviction in Louisi-
ana- A Oomparison, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 253 (1957).
6. 232 La. 996, 95 So.2d 632 (1957).
7. See LA. CIVM CODE art. 2047 (1870).
8. 2a2 La. 1026, 95 So.2d 644 (1957).
9. 231 La. 131, 90 So.2d 863 (1956).
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cover on the contract. The court affirmed an award made to
plaintiff to compensate him for part performance rendered on
the ground that the defendant had not asked that it be set aside.
Nevertheless, the opinion indicates that such an award may
properly be made to prevent unjust enrichment. This is believed
to be a sound approach. A contrary view would actually impose
a forfeiture by way of penalty. The authorities at common law
are not in complete accord.10
A contractor to whom a veteran agreed to pay a sum in ex-
cess of the amount of an appraisal by the Veterans Administra-
tion was denied recovery of it in Bamber v. Mayeux.1t In view of
the fact that the parties had contracted with each other before
the question of a Veterans Adminstration loan came up, and the
absence of any showing of bad faith, it is clear that the court is
disposed to give full protection to the veteran in keeping with
the spirit of the applicable federal statute.
In Probst v. Di Giovanni,12 a real estate broker recovered his
commission from the purchaser who failed to comply with his
obligation as provided in the contract for the purchase of the
property. The purchaser's reliance on a release given to him by
the vendor was properly rejected. As to the broker it was simply
res inter alios acta.
In Baton Rouge General Hospital v. Superior Cleaners,18 the
court, with obvious justification, found the evidence insufficient
to sustain plaintiff's contention that defendant had contractually
assumed responsibility for hospital services rendered to his in-
jured employee.
The cases of Elysian Homes, Inc. v. Davis,14 Branch v. Alex-
ander15 and Macaluso v. Thibodeaux6 involved questions of no
substantial import.
10. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 357 (1932), recognizing that quasi-con-
tractual recovery should be granted except in favor of one who commits a wilful
breach; Steel Storage & Elevator Construction Co. v. Stock, 225 N.Y. 173, 121
N.E. 786 (1919) ; WOODWARD, QUASI CONTRACTS § 178 (1913) ; Ballantine, For-
feiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REv. 329 (1921).
11. 232 La. 42, 93 So.2d 687 (1957).
12. 232 La. 811, 95 So.2d 321 (1957).
13. 231 La. 820, 93 So.2d 20 (1957).
14. 231 La. 95, 90 So.2d 791 (1956).
15. 231 La. 487, 91 So.2d 767 (1956).
16. 232 La. 431, 94 So.2d 426 (1957).
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